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Ethics and the Use of Coercion in the Treatment of Psychiatric Patients
Abstract
Involuntary psychiatric treatment occurs under such conditions as the medicating or placing in treatment
facilities of patients without their consent. Such involuntary treatment has been litigated in the Supreme
Court; however, the Court’s rulings have been applied to incarcerated persons, with the notable exception of
the 1975 ruling in O’Connor v. Donaldson, a case argued as a civil rights violation. Using O’Connor v.
Donaldson as a framework, this paper argues that forcing non- violent psychiatric patients to take medication,
or be otherwise treated against their will, is an unethical practice and must be discontinued. This practice of
forcible treatment violates the due process rights of patients, and is a violation of accepted medical ethics.
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patients without their consent. Such involuntary treatment has 
been litigated in the Supreme Court; however, the Court’s 
rulings have been applied to incarcerated persons, with the 
notable exception of the 1975 ruling in O’Connor v. Donaldson, 
a case argued as a civil rights violation. Using O’Connor v. 
Donaldson as a framework, this paper argues that forcing non-
violent psychiatric patients to take medication, or be otherwise 
treated against their will, is an unethical practice and must be 
discontinued. This practice of forcible treatment violates the due 
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 Involuntary psychiatric treatment occurs when patients 
are medicated, or placed in a treatment facility without their 
consent. While involuntary treatment has been litigated before 
the Supreme Court, with the exception of O'Connor v. 
Donaldson (1975), which was argued as a civil rights violation, 
the Court's rulings have been applied to incarcerated persons 
(Washington v. Harper, 1990; Riggins v. Nevada, 1992; Sell v. 
United States, 2003). Forcing non-violent psychiatric patients to 
take medication against their will is an unethical practice and 
should be discontinued. 
 
Historical Overview of Mental Health and Involuntary 
Treatment of Psychiatric Patients 
 For much of history, the treatments for mental illness 
have been coercive and inhumane. For centuries, those who were 
different, or socially unacceptable, were often accused of being 
witches or possessed by demons. The most innocuous of 
treatments was exorcism, in which priests attempted to vacate 
evil spirits that had invaded the body, which was supposed to 
cure the afflicted person. Trepanning, a practice in which a hole 
was drilled into the skull, exposing the outermost layer of the 
brain, was believed to release demons and cure various mental 
illnesses, including schizophrenia. When shock was discovered 
to alleviate symptoms, hydrotherapy—submerging patients in ice 
water—was implemented as a treatment. A more advanced 
technique, electroconvulsive therapy, consists of passing large 
amounts of electric current through a person's brain in an attempt 
to effect structural changes in the brain conducive to curing 
certain psychological problems (Barlow & Durand, 2009).  
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 In the early twentieth century in the United States, 
forced sexual sterilization was performed on those deemed 
unsuitable to reproduce (Buck v. Bell, 1927). Carrie Buck was a 
patient at the State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble Minded in 
Virginia. Based on a state law passed in 1924, Buck was deemed 
feeble-minded by heredity, and was ordered to undergo 
sterilization. Buck appealed to the Supreme Court on the basis 
that the forced sterilization order violated the due process clause 
of the Fifth Amendment and the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.1 The Court determined that Buck's due 
process rights had not been violated, and that not extending the 
sterilization statute to those outside state institutions did not 
violate the equal protection clause. The Court upheld the 
judgment forcing Buck to be sterilized, and ended with Justice 
Holmes' famous rejoinder: “Three generations of imbeciles are 
enough” (Buck v. Bell, 1927, p. 207). The right to procreate, 
despite the ruling in Buck v. Bell, is one of the fundamental 
rights, even though it is not written specifically in the text of 
the Constitution (Chemerinksy, 2001). 
 
Arguments in Favor of Ceasing Involuntary Treatment 
of Psychiatric Patients 
Case Law and Constitutional Rights 
 As citizens, certain rights and privileges are guaranteed 
by the Constitution. Those pertinent to this topic include the 
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The due process 
clause of the Fifth Amendment, which states “[n]o person 
                                                      1	  Perhaps	  a	  more	  appropriate	  constitutional	  argument	  would	  have	  been	  to	  assert	  that	  forced	  sterilization	  violated	  the	  protection	  against	  cruel	  and	  unusual	  punishment	  laid	  out	  in	  the	  Eighth	  Amendment.	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shall...be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of the law” (U.S. Const., amend. V), has been used in 
several cases to argue violations of due process in forcing 
treatment upon patients. The Sixth Amendment arguments 
generally used in the following cases relate to confronting 
witnesses and having counsel. The right used to argue against 
involuntary treatment in the Fourteenth Amendment is the equal 
protection clause, which states that no state may “deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws” (U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1). Practically 
speaking, the equal protection clause in the Fourteenth 
Amendment is essentially the same as the due process clause in 
the Fifth Amendment, but protects persons specifically from the 
states. 
 Since Buck v. Bell and the end of forced sterilization, 
there have been several landmark cases relating to involuntary 
treatment. The first such case was O'Connor v. Donaldson 
(1975). Using the provisions set forth in the United States Code 
for civil rights violations (42 U.S.C. § 1983), Kenneth 
Donaldson brought the action against Dr. O'Connor, the 
superintendent of the state mental facility in Florida in which he 
had been civilly committed for fifteen years. Donaldson claimed 
that O'Connor and his staff had intentionally deprived him of his 
constitutionally guaranteed right to liberty. Donaldson proved he 
had at no time been a danger to himself or to others, nor had he 
received any treatment for any perceived mental illnesses. 
O'Connor claimed that Florida state law allowed for the 
indefinite confinement of the mentally ill, without necessarily 
treating them or even allowing for their return to the community 
if deemed to not be dangerous. The Supreme Court held that 
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confining a harmless individual, who is able to survive freely in 
the community on his own, or with the help of private persons, 
on the basis of mental illness alone, is unconstitutional. Justice 
Potter Stewart asserted that the state had an interest in “providing 
care and assistance to the unfortunate,” but that mental illness 
itself did not necessarily “disqualify a person from preferring his 
home to the comforts of an institution” (O'Connor v. Donaldson, 
1975, p. 575). 
 The first case dealing with the rights of prisoners was 
Washington v. Harper (1990). Harper was serving a sentence in 
Washington for a robbery of which he was convicted in 1976. 
During his incarceration, Harper consented to the administration 
of anti-psychotic drugs. While not medicated, he was often 
violent, had been transferred to Washington's psychiatric prison 
on multiple occasions, and he was finally diagnosed as suffering 
from manic-depressive disorder. While there, Harper was forced 
to take anti-psychotic drugs based on a policy that stated that an 
inmate may be medicated against his will when ordered by a 
psychiatrist, if he met the following criteria: “suffer[ing] from a 
'mental disorder' and...'gravely disabled' or poses a 'likelihood of 
serious harm' to himself or others” (Washington v. Harper, 1990, 
p. 210). Harper filed a petition claiming that his forced 
medication regime violated the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court denied the claim; 
however, the State Supreme Court reversed the lower court's 
decision, concluding that medication could only be forced upon 
an inmate if the treatment was deemed medically necessary and 
such treatment furthered a compelling state interest. During 
litigation, the state ceased medicating Harper, but the Supreme 
Court decided that the issue at hand was still relevant. The Court 
held that an inmate who suffered from a severe mental illness 
5
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and posed a danger to himself or others could be medicated 
against his will if the treatment was in the inmate's best medical 
interests. In such cases, this was not a violation of the due 
process clause of the Fifth Amendment (Harper v. Washington, 
1990). 
 The basis for Riggins v. Nevada (1992) was similar to 
that of Harper. While awaiting trial for robbery and homicide, 
Riggins began suffering from auditory hallucinations and 
insomnia. A psychiatrist prescribed a powerful anti-psychotic 
and Riggins was later found to be competent to stand trial. 
Riggins moved to cease the administration of his anti-psychotic 
regime for the duration of the trial so that he could present an 
insanity defense. Riggins' argument was that the medication hid 
his mental state, denying him his due process rights. His request 
was denied and he was tried while still medicated. He still 
presented an insanity defense, but was convicted and sentenced 
to death. On appeal, the State Supreme Court held that expert 
testimony was sufficient in describing the effects of anti-
psychotic drugs on Riggins and his conviction was upheld. 
However, the Supreme Court maintained that for the state to 
satisfy Riggins' due process concerns, they had to prove that 
continuing his treatment was necessary and medically 
appropriate. Since this was not done, and the Court could find no 
compelling state interest in continuing to medicate Riggins, the 
Court held that Nevada's treatment of Riggins violated his Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The decision of the Supreme 
Court of Nevada was reversed, and Riggins' case was sent back 
to a lower trial court to be retried in a way not inconsistent with 
their findings (Riggins v. Nevada, 1992). 
 In Sell v. United States (2003), the petitioner, Sell, who 
had a non-violent history of delusional disorders, was on trial in 
6
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federal court for fraud and attempted murder. A Magistrate judge 
found him competent to stand trial and released him on bail. 
However, the Magistrate revoked Sell's bail when his condition 
worsened. After his bail was revoked, Sell requested that his 
competency to stand trial be reevaluated. Sell was examined by 
psychiatrists at the United States Medical Center for Federal 
Prisoners, was found incompetent to stand trial, and was ordered 
to be hospitalized to determine when, or if, he would be capable 
of standing trial. While hospitalized, Sell refused to take the anti-
psychotic drugs prescribed to him, and Medical Center officials 
sought to have him forcibly medicated, a decision Sell appealed. 
The Magistrate determined that Sell was a danger to himself and 
others, and that medicating him was the only way to diminish his 
dangerousness. The Magistrate also determined that the benefits 
of medicating Sell outweighed the risks of any potential side 
effects, and the regime of drug therapy proposed would likely 
have the effect of returning Sell's competency, making it possible 
for him to stand trial. Sell appealed to the District Court, who 
found the Magistrate's determination of dangerousness 
inaccurate, but affirmed his stance on drug therapy as an attempt 
to return Sell's competency. The Supreme Court, as laid out in 
prior cases (Washington v. Harper, 1990; Riggins v. Nevada, 
1992), stated that the Constitution permits involuntary 
administration of  medication aimed at  “render[ing] a mentally 
ill defendant competent to stand trial on serious...charges 
if...medically appropriate...substantially unlikely to have side 
effects...undermin[ing] the trial's fairness, and, taking account of 
less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further 
important governmental trial-related interests” (Sell v. United 
States, 2003, p. 167). However, this standard was rather high and 
infrequently applied because of several stringent criteria required 
7
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to meet the test. Using a strict scrutiny test, it must be 
determined that forcing a defendant to take medication against 
his will for the express purposes of making him competent to 
stand trial achieves a vital and compelling government interest, 
under which national security and similar interests would fall. 
Other considerations must also be taken into account, such as a 
defendant's confinement in an institution during the period of 
time in which he is incompetent to stand trial, which would 
protect the community from the defendant as well as depriving 
the defendant of the same types of liberties normally lost during 
incarceration (Sell v. United States, 2003). 
 As pointed out by mental health professionals who have 
studied the Sell decision, the Court found itself weighing the 
autonomy and liberties of the accused with that of the safety of 
the community at large (Heilbrun & Kramer, 2005; Hunter, 
Ritchie, & Spaulding, 2005), which is what trial courts are often 
asked to balance. Hunter et al. (2005) pointed out two main 
responses for mental health professionals in dealing with the Sell 
decision: the consideration by clinicians of factors such as 
context and environment when determining dangerousness, and 
“the importance of providing [the] least restrictive services prior 
to such interventions that violate patients' liberty interests” 
(Hunter et al., 2005, p. 467). Sell, like Harper and Riggins, 
related only to competency issues and the coercive treatment of 
mentally ill defendants (Heilbrun & Kramer, 2005). However, 
those who have analyzed Sell agreed that, as with non-
psychiatric defendants and inmates, violating the laws does 
rescind some civil liberties, most notably freedom (Heilbrun & 
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Medical Ethics and the Freedom of Choice 
 Outside the realm of criminality, there appeared to be 
multiple schools of thought on the use of coercion in treating the 
mentally ill. Some stressed that patients need to be treated 
respectfully and be allowed to make their own decisions 
regarding their treatments with absolutely no coercion involved 
(Heilbrun & Kramer, 2005). Others, however, found that 
coercion was sometimes a necessity in dealing with certain types 
of patients, and without the help of the judiciary, these patients 
would never get the treatment they needed (Heilbrun & Kramer, 
2005). 
 Civil liberties were not the only obstacles in the way of 
coercive treatments. Connor (1996) explained that the 
therapeutic value of psychiatric treatments, especially 
psychotherapy, was negated when coercion was involved. 
Successful psychotherapy required a high level of trust between 
patient and therapist, and this trust cannot be garnered through a 
forced relationship. According to Connor (1996), the outcome of 
a patient's therapy was directly proportional to the relationship 
that developed between patient and therapist. 
 Medical ethics naturally do not lend themselves to the 
use of coercive treatment. The basic tenets of medical ethics 
generally fall under the following four principles: patient 
autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice (Gillon, 
1994). Patient autonomy essentially means respecting a patient's 
right to choose which, if any, treatment option is best 
considering the circumstances in which one finds oneself. The 
foundation for patient autonomy is based on Emmanuel Kant's 
ideal of respecting the person. The concepts of beneficence and 
non-maleficence can be best explained to mean that healthcare 
professionals, in this case psychiatrists, must do what is in the 
9
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best interests of their patients, and they must also avoid harming 
patients. Justice, the final of the four principles, includes 
distributive justice, which relates to the allocation of healthcare 
funding for various programs in a way that is as fair to as many 
persons as possible (Gillon, 1994). 
 Chemerinsky (2001) explained that the right to make 
one's own medical decisions is fundamental, including the right 
to refuse treatment. Bassman (2005) posed the question “[a]re 
there indisputable benefits to the individual and the community 
that justify forcing people to relinquish their right to choice 
because of assessments of mental illness and its often associated 
implication of global incapacity?” (p. 488). This question was 
philosophical, ethical, and political in nature. Bassman asserted, 
much as Connor (1996) did before him, that coercion, and the 
threat of force, is contrary to the nature of medicine and healing. 
The threat of force will dissuade the mentally ill from seeking 
treatment that may actually be beneficial to them (Bassman, 
2005). 
 
Arguments in Favor of Continued Coercive Treatments 
for Psychiatric Patients 
Assisted Outpatient Treatment Laws 
 According to the Treatment Advocacy Center, a non-
profit organization based in Virginia, there are currently forty-
five states that have some version of an assisted outpatient 
treatment law (Treatment Advocacy Center, 2011). The only 
states that have no such laws are Connecticut, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Mexico, and Tennessee (Treatment 
Advocacy Center, 2011). 
 New York's outpatient treatment law is known as 
Kendra's Law. Passed in 1999, the law lists four criteria by 
10
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which a person can be placed into an assisted treatment program: 
the patient must be at least eighteen years of age; suffering from 
a mental illness; based on a clinician's assessment, be unable, or 
unlikely to be able, to live in the community without some form 
of non-private assistance; and have a history of refusing 
psychiatric treatment. The patient must also be likely to benefit 
from an assisted treatment program (New York Mental Hygiene 
Law ch. 27 title B § 9.60). 
 While at first it may appear as though assisted treatment 
laws are at odds with the various Supreme Court rulings related 
to forcible treatments, such as Washington, Riggins, and Sell, 
that is not the case. Each of the aforementioned cases are 
specifically related to defendants awaiting trial, in the case of 
Harper and Sell, or a specific due process violation during the 
trial phase of a convicted prisoner in the case of Riggins. The 
closest to the case law these treatment laws come is the 
O'Connor case, in which Donaldson was civilly committed to a 
mental institution for nearly fifteen years. However, there are 
significant differences between assisted treatment laws and the 
O'Connor case. Donaldson was not actually treated in any way 
for a mental illness, whereas the purpose of Kendra's Law is to 
treat severely mentally ill persons. 
 However, as Chemerinsky (2001) stated, freedom and 
liberty are fundamental rights, as is control over one's medical 
decisions, including refusal of treatment. Perlin (2003), in his 
study of Kendra's Law, determined that it violates the rights of 
individuals who have committed no crime. Kendra's Law 
violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment 
protecting against the deprivation of “life, liberty, or property” 
(U.S. Const., amend. V). 
 
11
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The Necessity of Coercion in the Treatment of Certain 
Psychiatric Patients 
 As noted in Heilbrun and Kramer (2005), a segment of 
mental health professionals have claimed that a certain degree of 
coercion is necessary in treating certain patients, who, without 
the assistance of the judiciary, would likely attempt to remain 
untreated. However, coercion in the absence of proof of 
dangerousness and criminality is antithetical to the very nature of 
a free society and the fundamental rights therein. The therapeutic 
value of psychiatric treatments, especially psychotherapy, are 
negated when coercion is involved (Connor, 1996). Successful 
psychotherapy requires a high level of trust between patient and 
therapist, and this trust cannot be garnered through a forced 
relationship (Connor, 1996). Therefore, coercion is not a valid, 




 Coercive treatments for mental illnesses did not cease as 
the modern era dawned. The topic of coercive and involuntary 
treatment of psychiatric patients remains relevant today. The 
fundamental rights relating to personal autonomy in medical 
decisions are not absolute in all circumstances, as recent case 
law makes clear (Washington v. Harper, 1990; Riggins v. 
Nevada, 1992; Sell v. United States, 2003). In relation to 
criminal defendants and prisoners, the distinction of being a 
danger to oneself or to others is an important factor in 
determining the constitutionality of medicating a patient against 
one’s will (Washington v. Harper, 1990; Sell v. United States, 
2003). The prevalence of assisted outpatient treatment laws, such 
as Kendra's Law in New York, suggests this is a problem that 
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will continue for some time. Given the opinions of the Supreme 
Court on the matter, and the assertion by many mental health 
professionals that coercion and the threat of force actually 
hamper the possibility of recovery in relation to mental illnesses 
(Connor, 1996; Bassman, 2005), as well as the fundamental 
rights that live on in the Constitution (Chemerinsky, 2001), it is 
clear that, without the presence of violence or dangerousness, 
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